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EVE HILL*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article was born from the conjunction of two seemingly unrelated
events: A course in Negotiation for Lawyers' and participation in various
feminist activities at Cornell Law School.2 The lessons of the two con-
flicted at nearly every juncture. Negotiation seemed to me to leave out as
many crucial landmarks as the adversary system, while feminism sug-
gested that alternative dispute resolution offered some hope for trans-
forming the legal system. Finally, in the last days of the Negotiation
class the two came together and worked. During the final negotiation
exercise, three women and one man divided several objects among them.
The method of distribution we chose included honestly stating our pref-
erences about the objects and then drawing cards when those preferences
conflicted. While watching the videotape of this exercise, the professor
was amused by the "objective criteria"3 we used to facilitate our value-
claiming,4 as opposed to value-creative, 5 bargaining. He noted, however,
that we had avoided a common problem of so-called "objective criteria:"
such criteria generally favor the position of the person who suggests
them." This statement brought feminism and alternative dispute resolu-
tion together for me. Recalling Catherine MacKinnon's feelings that
* B.A. 1986, Sweet Briar College; J.D. 1989, Cornell Law School. Ms. Hill is an associ-
ate at the Washington, D.C. law firm of Pierson, Semmes & Finley. The author wishes to
thank Professor Robert Kent, Professor Dale Oesterle, and all the writers cited in this
Article.
I. Offered at Cornell Law School, January, 1989. Taught by Professor Dale Oesterle.
2. These activities included organizing a symposium on Feminism and the Law (March
3-4, 1989), joining a student-taught class on Feminism and Law, and studying the works of
feminist writers on my own.
3. R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT Giv-
ING IN 84-98 (1981), urges negotiators to use "objective criteria," rather than claiming
tactics, to resolve conflicts in distributive bargaining situations, see infra note 4. These
authors intended the term "objective criteria" to include "standards of fairness, efficiency,
[and] scientific merit," R. FISHER & W. URY, id. at 86, along with professional standards,
moral standards, tradition, what a court would decide, etc. Id. at 89. They even include
"[d]rawing lots, flipping a coin, and other forms of chance .. " Id. at 90.
Fisher and Ury's "win-win" approach to negotiation will be discussed more fully, infra
notes 64-85 and accompanying text.
4. See D. LAX & J. SEBENIUs, THE MANAGER As NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR COOP-
ERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 32-33 (1986).
5. Id. at 30-32.
6. To use an example from R, FISHER & W. URY, supra note 3, at 88, a hard-bargaining
insurance claims adjuster will not bring up the objective criterion of "what the [insured
and demolished] car could have been sold for," id., unless that figure favors her position.
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"objective criteria" are not objective7 (they are male), a I realized that
the source of much of my discontent with the judicial system was its
particularly male approach even to particularly female issues. This ap-
proach had been brought into alternative dispute resolution.'
This Article will explore the possibilities and problems of alternative
dispute resolution methods from a feminist perspective. I will focus on
negotiation, mediation, and arbitration, and I will apply the feminist per-
spectives of Carol Gilligan,' ° Catherine MacKinnon,"' and others. 2
Alternative dispute resolution has great potential as part of feminist
jurisprudence, but its success is limited by the male perspective that
dominates our legal system generally. This limit will only be completely
eliminated when our society develops beyond its male-centered perspec-
tive. Meanwhile, however, teaching alternative dispute resolution with a
serious focus on female voices is, I believe, an important step in the at-
tempt "[t]o remake [legal] society so that women can live [and work]
h e r e . . . .., ,. 3
7. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Juris-
prudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 635-39 n.6 (1983)[hereinafter Toward Feminist Jurisprudence].
"[m]ale dominance is perhaps the most pervasive and tenacious system of power in history,
[and] it is metaphysically nearly perfect. Its point of view is the standard for point-of-
viewlessness, its particularity is the meaning of universality." Id. at 638-39. See also C.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 54-55, 86-87 (1987)
[hereinafter FEMINISM UNMODIFIED].
8. What I mean when I use this term will hopefully become clear later, see infra notes
175-205 and accompanying text. See generally C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSY-
CHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (exploring the differences be-
tween "male" and "female" thought processes and moral and psychological development).
The term "male" (or "female") does not necessarily include all men (or women). Nor does
it exclude all women (or men). Rather, the "male" approach or perspective or voice is the
one that is accepted and acted upon by our society and is, I believe, predominant in men,
while the female approach/perspective/voice is predominant in women. See MacKinnon,
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 7, at 636 n.3.
9. By this I do not mean that the class was biased against women. Apparently women
did as well (grade-wise) as men in the class and people of both genders learned a great
deal. What I do mean is that I fear we all learned that we had better adopt a male per-
spective and voice if we expect to succeed in the legal profession, even if we never step foot
in court. Women, of course, are as good at adopting this voice as men are. I believe we
should not have to adopt it.
10. See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 8.
11. See C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 7; C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979); MacKinnon, Reply to Miller, Acker and
Barry, Johnson, West, and Gardiner, 10 SIGNS 184 (1984); MacKinnon, Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, supra note 7; MacKinnon, Feminsm, Marxism, Method, and the State: An
Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982)[hereinafter Agenda].
12. Janet Rifkin, for example, has taken a feminist perspective on mediation. Rifkin,
Mediation From a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems, 2 LAW AND INEQUALITY
21 (1984). 1 plan to expand upon her approach.
13. C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 7, at 16.
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I. ADJUDICATION AND THE NEED FOR ALTERNATIVES
The legal system in the United States has traditionally focused on
court adjudication as the central method for resolving disputes. Such ad-
judication involves a state-chosen third-party decisionmaker who makes
a binding choice between the disputing parties. The decisionmaker is
neutral and usually not a specialist in the subject of the dispute. The
process is highly formal. Arguments are limited by substantive, proce-
dural, and evidentiary rules. These arguments are generally presented by
the parties' representatives rather than by the parties themselves. The
stance of the parties and their representatives is adversarial and antago-
nistic. The process generally results in a "win-lose" decision and the
remedies available may be limited. The decisions occasionally establish
societal norms or legal precedents. 4
A. The Need for Alternatives - Generally
A number of factors have apparently contributed to the recent interest
in alternative methods of dispute resolution. First, the recent increase in
American society's litigiousness' 5 and the availability of lawyers to fulfill
this desire to litigate16 have led to overcrowded court dockets. This over-
crowding, in combination with the delay and expense caused by the for-
mality inherent in litigation, has led lawyers to seek more efficient meth-
ods for resolving conflicts. Also, the need to increase community
involvement in dispute resolution processes and to increase the public's
14. See S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 8 (1985) (a table
comparing basic elements of "primary" dispute resolution processes); L. KANOWiTZ, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 9-10 (1985); L. RISKIN & J.
WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 2-3 (1987). But see Chayes, The Role
of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). Chayes argues that,
while my description of the judicial system has traditionally been true, the judicial system
has changed and is changing. In fact, those changes seem to be taking the criticisms posed
by the alternative dispute resolution movement into account. I favor these changes, but I do
not believe the transformation is completed yet. At the very least, traditional law school
courses have not yet taken these changes seriously and, therefore, are still producing law-
yers prepared to face the traditional model.
15. See Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing
the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1361-62.
The reality of this litigation explosion seems to be somewhat in doubt. See L. KANOWITZ,
supra note 14, at 7-8. There is, at any rate, little doubt about the real problems of delay
and expense in litigation.
16. See J. MURRAY, A. RAU & E. SHERMAN. PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE
ROLE OF LAWYERS 16 (1989).
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access to the justice system arguably sparked the search for
alternatives. 17
Other commentators assert that alternative dispute resolution tech-
niques are preferable to adjudication in certain cases where the nature of
the dispute requires a broader range of remedies and a broader focus on
the issues involved than a court can provide. Alternative dispute resolu-
tion is also beneficial where the parties need to continue their relation-
ship after the dispute is resolved and, therefore, cannot afford the antag-
onism that adversary proceedings often breed. Moreover, where technical
expertise, which courts generally do not possess, is necessary for a proper
resolution of the dispute, alternative dispute mechanisms offer preferable
results.18 Finally, some argue that the alternative dispute resolution
movement is properly fueled by the sense that nonadjudicatory tech-
niques increase the quality of dispute resolution. "Solutions to disputes
can be tailored to the parties' polycentfic needs and can achieve greater
party satisfaction and enforcement reliability because they are not bi-
nary, win/lose results."1 9 I call this the quality-of-justice argument.
B. The Need for Alternatives - Feminist View
The feminist perspective20 shares a great deal with the quality-of-jus-
tice argument for alternative dispute resolution. It suggests that the pro-
17. See S. GOLDBhRG. E. GREEN, & F. SANDER, supra note 14, at 6-7 (discussing these
and other goals and noting that the goal of increased community involvement is unlikely to
succeed in today's mobile culture and that the goal of increased access to justice conflicts to
some extent with the goal of easing the burden on courts).
18. See L. KANOWITZ, supra note 14, at 9.
19. Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory
Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 487 (1985)(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter
For and Against Settlement]. See also Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal
Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Toward Another View]. Some commentators seem to see the differences between this
quality-of-justice approach and the approach outlined supra text accompanying note 18, as
merely an argument over how frequently the types of cases which are inappropriate for
judicial resolution arise. See Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073, 1073-87 (1984).
I believe, however, that the quality-of-justice approach, at least as modified by feminism,
speaks not only to specific cases inappropriate for judicial resolution, however frequently
those cases may arise, but to the adversary system as a whole.
20. This perspective is actually a combination of diverse perspectives.
Feminism aspires to represent the experience of all women as women see it, yet criticizes
antifeminism and misogyny, including when it appears in female form. This tension is com-
pressed in the epistemic term of art 'the standpoint of all women.' We are barely beginning
to unpack it. Not all women agree with the feminist account of women's situation, nor do
all feminists agree with any single rendition of feminism.
MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 7, at 637 n.5. Carrie Menkel-
Meadow and Janet Rifkin have come closest to applying this perspective to alternative
dispute resolution. See Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement, supra note 19, at
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cess has a tremendous effect on the substantive results obtained. It fur-
ther suggests that the choice of process is important, in its own right, as
a means for remaking the legal system to take account of women's per-
spectives, for making women's voices heard, and for generally improving
the relationship between the legal system and the people it is supposed to
serve.
The traditional legal system fails under this perspective because, in
addition to the failings discussed above, it uses objectivity, adverseness,
hierarchy, and abstraction as its primary tools. The traditional legal sys-
tem is based on these ideals.
1. Objectivity. The objective or nuetral stance is traditionally under-
stood to be no stance at all. The court ideally takes a position removed
from the parties and the issues before it. The court presumably has no
feelings about either party. The same is true, ideally, of the substantive,
procedural, and evidentiary law, which acts as a filter between the court
and the parties. If these ideals work, the result reached in the case is
presumably just.
Feminists believe, however, that the objective stance is really the male
stance. 21 This is so for a number of practical and societal reasons. First,
the members of our courts are, and always have been, predominately
male. This not only causes a potential problem of bias in favor of male
parties, but it also injects a male perspective into the proceedings, which
sets a, male standard for the parties to meet and which decides questions
in a male way.22 Second, the lawmakers in our legislatures are predomi-
nately male. This, again, raises problems of bias and male perspective,
standards, and decisionmaking methods in the law that legislatures pro-
duce. It is reasonable to expect that this male-centered law, when com-
bined with our male-centered courts will produce male-centereq decisions
through male-centered processes.23 In addition, our society and our gov-
ernment have been created and dominated, in terms of power, if not in
terms of numbers, by men and have traditionally praised the male per-
spective as the only right/moral/legal/mature perspective. Society has
thus made the male-centeredness of the legal system legitimate, neces-
sary, and proper, and has turned the male perspective into the only, the
490; Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 19, at 763-64 n.28; Rifkin, supra
note 12.
21. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 7, at 54-55; MacKin-
non, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 7, at 644-45. For an explanation of what
the male stance entails, see infra notes 175-91 and 156-60 and accompanying text.
22. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 7, at 645.
23. Id. at 644-55 (using the law of rape to demonstrate the exclusively male perspective
inherent in our legal system).
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objective, perspective.24 This societal factor, if left unchanged, would
skew the justice of adjudicated decisions even if most judges and legisla-
tors were not biologically male, because law-makers and law-appliers are
socialized into a male perspective since childhood.
2. Adverseness. The judicial system relies on lawyers to inject ad-
verseness into its proceedings. Lawyers take opposing positions and do
battle before the court. Ideally, this battling reveals the truth. The ad-
versarial process is subject to many criticisms. For example, the lawyers
tend to take polar positions and the courts tend to choose passively be-
tween the sides. This process seems, therefore, likely to miss the truth if
it is somewhere between the poles.
The feminist perspective challenges the adversary process because it is
a particularly male process. It fails to take women's perspectives into
account. According to Carol Gilligan's2 5 theory, the ideal of competition
between poles fits into the male perspective of weighing abstract rights.2 "
It does not fit into the female perspective, which focuses on the relation-
ship between the parties.2 7 The adversary process is a serious threat to
that relationship, just as aggressive competition is a threat to any posi-
tive relationship. The female perspective prefers reconciliation of differ-
ent positions, rather than choice between them. The female perspective
prefers to look beyond the opposing positions of the parties - to look
between and behind the positions for the truth.28 The adversary system,
by having lawyers argue opposite positions over narrow legal issues
within a rigid evidentiary and procedural structure, prevents just such
looking between and beyond. The female perspective prefers interper-
sonal communication to conflict and competition. 2 The adversary system
encourages conflict and competition.
24. Id. at 644-45, 655-57, 658.
25. See generally C. GILLIGAN, supra note 8, at 25-63 (describing the male and female
perspectives). See also supra notes 161-205 and accompanying text.
26. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 8, at 32 ("[The male view] abstracts the moral problem
from the interpersonal situation, finding in the logic of fairness an objective way to decide
who will win the dispute.").
27. Id. at 30 ("[The female's] world is a world of relationships and psychological truths
where an awareness of the connection between people gives rise to a recognition of respon-
sibility for one another, a perception of the need for response.... [She] see[s] the actors in
the dilemma arrayed not as opponents in a contest of rights but as members of a network
of relationships on whose continuation they all depend.").
28. Id. at 31 ("[The] two . . . see two very different moral problems - [the male] a
conflict between life and property that can be resolved by logical deduction, [the female] a
fracture of human relationship that must be mended with its own thread.").
29. Id. at 30-31 ("Consequently her solution to the dilemma lies in activating the net-
work [of relationships] by communication, securing . . . inclusion. . . by strengthening
rather than severing connections.").
[Vol. 5:2 1990]
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3. Hierarchy and Abstraction. The feminist perspective also chal-
lenges the legal system's rigid hierarchies of actors and of rights. Ideally,
hierarchy among the legal system's actors ensures that a final deci-
sionmaker will always be availab'e to resolve conflicts. Hierarchy among
rights ideally makes decision-making easy, mathematical, and predict-
able. It also ideally reflects society's preferences and values.
Carol Gilligan's theory suggests, however, that hierarchical rankings
are particularly consistent with the male perspective. The female per-
spective, with its emphasis on relationships, communication, and interac-
tion, accepts hierarchy only as an undesirable last resort 30 Further, fem-
inism rejects hierarchy as reflecting and enforcing male dominance.31
Similarly, the feminist perspective challenges the law's reliance on ab-
stract rights. Ideally, abstraction ensures that the law is unbiased, imper-
sonal, and generally applicable. In the feminist view, however, abstrac-
tion is an element of the male voice. The female voice, in contrast,
focuses on real context rather than on generalities."2 The feminist view
also rejects abstraction because it blinds the justice system to women's
experience, which is generally ignored in society's abstract definitions of
reality.33
III. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION - BACKGROUND
This Article will focus on negotiation, mediation, and arbitration, al-
though many other alternative dispute resolution techniques exist.34 This
section will describe generally the methods, goals, and uses of these three
techniques. It will also explore how well each technique achieves the
goals of the alternative dispute resolution movement.
A. Negotiation
Negotiation is the process of two or more parties working together to
resolve a conflict between them by creating a solution to which all can
agree. It is the practice of "communication for the purpose of persuasion
[and it] is the preeminent mode of dispute resolution."35 It occurs in
30. See infra text accompanying notes 175-85.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 147-55.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 175-85.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 147-55.
34. For example, community justice centers, rent-a-judge programs, judicial settlement
conferences, and small claims court.
35. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 14, at 19.
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many diverse situations in everyday life. It is also an important aspect of
lawyering 6 The basic preconditions to negotiation are:
1. There is a conflict of interest between two or more parties; that is,
what one wants is not necessarily what the other one wants.
2. There is no fixed or established set of rules or procedures for resolv-
ing the conflict, or the parties prefer to work outside of a set of rules and
procedures to invent their own solution to the conflict.
3. The parties, at least for the moment, prefer to search for agreement
rather than openly fight, to have one side capitulate, to permanently
break off contact, or to take their dispute to a higher authority to resolve
it.37
1. Goals. The goals of negotiation vary according to the context in
which it is used. Basically, it allows the parties to work out their own
creative solution to their dispute without intervention from the state.
Further, it can avoid the binary, win/lose results of judicial decision.
Negotiation increases party involvement in, and thus attachment to, the
solution. It can also avoid the antagonism inherent in adversary proceed-
ings. It can avoid the cost and delay of adjudication and lessen the
caseloads of courts. Finally, negotiation allows a broader scope of inquiry
and range of remedies than does court adjudication.
2. Methods. There are two primary approaches to negotiation: the
competitive/adversarial/hard approach and the cooperative/problem-
solving/soft approach. The competitive approach is the traditional ap-
proach to negotiation.3 8 The cooperative approach has come to light
more recently.39
a. The Competitive Approach
i. Structure and process. The structure of a competitive negotiation is a
"stylized linear ritual of struggle."40 The main elements are:
"I. making high initial demands;
2. maintaining a high level of demands in the course of negotiation;
3. making few concessions;
4. making small concessions (when concessions are made); and
5. having a generally high level of aspiration." '
36. Id.
37. R. LEWICKI & J. LITTERER. NEGOTIATION 4 (1985).
38. See Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 19, at 764-65.
39. See R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 3; Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View,
supra note 19.
40. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 19, at 767.
41. G. WILLIAMS. LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 48 (1983).
[Vol. 5:2 1990]
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This approach proceeds along a "linear field of pre-established 'commit-
ment and resistance' points""2 and results in "[a] 'focal point' midway
between the first offers of each party. ' 43 This structure encourages com-
promise at a midway point. It further encourages competitive strategies,
emphasizing "an argumentative, debate form of discussion"" "charac-
terized by arguments and statements rather than questions and searches
for new information.' 45 It encourages negotiators to hide their own
desires and to manipulate their opponents' perceptions of the possibilities
for agreement. The tactics for accomplishing this include commitments,
threats, extreme positions and offers, lying, exaggeration, ridicule, accu-
sation, bluffs, moral language, and power tactics. 6 Competitive negotia-
tors create tension and pressure for their opponents. They are motivated
by the desire to win, to outmaneuver their opponents, and to maximize
payoff.47
ii. Effects. "Experimental studies of bargaining have shown that in
many settings, use of toughness increases profits for the tough negotia-
tor."'4" If used effectively, competitive bargaining strategies can manipu-
late and intimidate the opponent, causing her to lose confidence and to
reduce her expectations. 49 However, this approach has serious draw-
backs. The tension and distrust created by this approach can distort the
communication between the parties and lead to misunderstandings." The
42. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 19, at 767.
43. Id. Carrie Menkel-Meadow offers the following model of this linear structure:
Zone of Agreement
x Y
-------- 4------------------------ --- >
R, Tx
T = Target Point
R = Resistance Point
Id. at 769.
44. Id. at 777.
45. Id. at 778.
46. See D. LAX & J. SEBENIUS, supra note 4, at 122-44; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 41, at
49.
47. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 41, at 49. See also id. at 23-25 (describing the characteris-
tics of effective competitive negotiators: tough, dominant, forceful, aggressive, attacking,
ambitious, egotist, arrogant, clever, rigid, disinterested in opponent's needs, etc.).
48. Id. at 49.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 50.
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
high level of emotion this approach creates can increase the likelihood of
impasse,"1 and, when impasse occurs, can increase the likelihood of retal-
iation.5 Further, the competitive approach can seriously damage the
long-term relationship between the parties and the reputation of the
negotiator.53
This strategy may also negatively affect the outcome of negotiation.
The linear structure and the competitive tactics may force the parties
into directly opposing postures, which may inhibit their ability to find
creative solutions.5" Further, competitive tactics simply may not work. If
the opponent recognizes the tactics or if the competitive negotiator dis-
guises her desires too well, the competitive approach may backfire.5 Fi-
nally, the competitive, adversary approach may exclude the real parties
from participation in resolving their dispute. The parties may relinquish
control over the process and the outcome to the aggressive negotiator.5
The above discussion shows that the competitive approach may actu-
ally defeat some of the traditional purposes of the alternative dispute
resolution movement. For example, the increased likelihood of impasse
may defeat the twin goals of lessening the burden on courts and lowering
the cost of dispute resolution. 57 Also, negotiation conducted through this
process may be just as ineffective as adjudication at resolving the partic-
ular types of disputes deemed inappropriate for judicial resolution. 8 The
focus on polar positions and linear progression may limit the scope of
inquiry and the range of remedies available. The adversary approach to
negotiation damages the relationship between the parties just as adjudi-
cation does. Finally, the competitive approach may defeat the quality-of-
justice arguments in favor of alternative dispute resolution by leading to
win/lose outcomes and by decreasing the parties' participation in, emo-
tional satisfaction with, and attachment to the final agreement.59
iii. The Underlying Assumption. The competitive approach to negotia-
tion assumes that negotiation is a "zero-sum game,"60 that is, that it
involves only one issue and that the parties desire the thing at issue
equally and exclusively. This is the same assumption that underlies ad-
51. Id. at 50-51.
52. Id. at 52.
53. Id.
54. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 19, at 778.
55. Id. at 779-82.
56. Id. at 782-83.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
58. See supra text accompanying note 18.
59. See supra text accompanying note 19.
60. See Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 19, at 756 n.4 ("A zero-
sum game is strictly-speaking, one where the total winnings for one party minus the total
losses for the other party equal zero."). See also id. at 784.
[Vol. 5:2 1990]
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versarial court proceedings and that has limited the scope of judicial in-
quiry and remedies. In reality, zero-sum games are quite rare."1 Factors
which limit the zero-sum quality of negotiation include: the involvement
of multiple issues (timing, delivery, and manner of payment issues, for
example, can transform an apparent zero-sum negotiation into a non-
zero-sum game); the parties' different valuations of scarce resources
(some parties may value money more than others; parties may assess risk
differently); and the fact that resources are not really as scarce as is
commonly believed. 2 The competitive approach -ignores these factors
and thus limits the potential of negotiation.
The competitive approach also assumes the necessity of win/lose re-
sults and limited remedies. One party wins on one issue and the other
party wins on the next issue. This is particularly true of legal negotia-
tion, because it takes place "in the shadow of the court."6 3 Negotiators
tend to limit themselves to what a court would do. This also occurs in
contract negotiations, where it is particularly unfortunate because the
range of possible solutions is so broad that limiting assumptions can lead
parties to miss important opportunities. These assumptions make com-
petitive negotiations no real, substantive alternative to adjudication.
b. The Cooperative Approach
i. Structure and process. The cooperative approach to negotiation is
most clearly described in Roger Fisher and William Ury's book, Getting
to Yes. 4 Fisher and Ury argue that, rather than falling into traditional
negotiation patterns, negotiators should "[c]hange the game."' 3 The four
basic elements of the new game are:
"People: Separate the people from the problem.
Interests: Focus on interests, not positions.
61. Id. at 784-88.
62. A. KOHN, NO CONTEST: THE CASE AGAINST COMPETITION 193 (1986) ("Most scar-
city is artificial ... because a prized status has been set up where none existed before")
(emphasis added). Alfie Kohn argues that we unnecessarily contrive contests and that,
when we encounter what appeals to be real scarcity, we fail to consider the fact that the
scarcity may not be "decreed by God. It is the result of a decision that can be changed."
Id. The assumptions of competitive negotiation, in fact, work to contrive contests and to
disguise the alterability of "real" scarcity.
63. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 19, at 789.
64. Supra note 3. Fisher and Ury distinguish their approach from "soft" negotiation
which they believe is based on the same assumptions and structure as the competitive ap-
proach, but which takes a conciliatory, conflict-avoiding stance. Id. at xii. See also Menkel-
Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 19.
65. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 3, at 10.
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Options: Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do.
Criteria: Insist that the result be based on some objective standard.""6
The cooperative approach thus begins, not with polar opposition, but
with an attitude of cooperation toward reaching a common goal.6 This
approach requires negotiators to pay attention to the relationship be-
tween the parties and between the negotiators; to treat each other as
people rather than as obstacles.68 Negotiators separate the "people prob-
lems'" 9 from the substantive dispute and resolve the people problems di-
rectly, by focusing on each other's perceptions and emotions, and on ef-
fective communication."0 This approach focuses on understanding and
working out these people problems, rather than on manipulating them
and using them to your own advantage.
The second element of cooperative bargaining, focusing on interests
rather than positions, involves understanding the real needs )f the par-
ties.7 1 Cooperative negotiators must not assume that both parties exclu-
sively desire exactly the same thing. Rather, they must find out what lies
behind the dispute and exactly what the parties do desire.72 Then they
must base the negotiation discourse on these interests. This element of
the cooperative approach removes negotiation from the rigid linear struc-
ture that competitive bargaining assumes and imposes. 713 It thus broadens
the scope of inquiry and the range of available solutions.
The third element, generating a variety of possible solutions, allows
negotiators to explore the possibility that resources are not as scarce as
they seem. This element lets negotiators transform seemingly zero-sum
games into non-zero-sum problems.7 4 It allows them to use multiple is-
sues, differing assessments of value and risk, and the alterability of re-
source scarcity7 5 to expand the pie to be shared among the parties.76 This
allows for solutions which make all parties better off.
The fourth element of Fisher and Ury's approach, using objective cri-
teria, involves basing decisions and results expressly on standards exter-
nal to the parties, such as justice, fairness, the law, or random chance.
Using these criteria helps to avoid the manipulative pressure tactics of
66. Id. at 11.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 19-20.
69. Id. at 22.
70. Id. at 22-40.
71. Id. at 41-57.
72. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 19, at 801-04.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
74. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 19, at 809.
75. See supra text accompanying note 62.
76. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 3, at 58-83.
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competitive negotiation 77 and helps to ensure the objective fairness of the
final agreement. 8 The criteria thus work not only to reach a better sub-
stantive result, but also to improve the process of bargaining. The pro-
cess, because of its psychological effects, may be just as important to the
long-term success of the bargain as the substantive result obtained.
The cooperative approach operates very differently in practice than the
competitive approach does. The progression of offers and counteroffers is
less linear because it takes diverse interests, rather than just polar posi-
tions, into account. The solutions available for discuission are less limited
and traditional. Both parties may "win" (defined as doing better than
you would have if no agreement had been reached or if the other party
had taken all the value involved, rather than as doing better than your
opponent) on any given issue. Cooperative negotiation also involves more
information-sharing and more real communication. It proceeds through
principled justification and active listening, rather than through argu-
mentation, bullying, bluffing, and power tactics. Cooperative negotiators
demonstrate trust and good faith by making unilateral concessions which
encourage reciprocation..7' They view negotiation as problem-solving,
tather than as gamesmanship. 0
ii. Effects. Evidence suggests that cooperative negotiation is highly ef-
fective at maximizing joint gains."' The cooperative approach also results
in fewer impasses, and, when impasse does occur, decreases the likeli-
hood of retaliation.82 It seems to impose less risk on the continuing rela-
tionships between the parties and between the negotiators. It also en-
courages the active participation of the parties, because it prevents
negotiators from assuming they know the parties' interests. The parties,
therefore, must participate in uncovering real interests and in evaluating
proposals. 3 Cooperative negotiation broadens the scope of inquiry and
the range of remedies, thus avoiding win/lose results.
The cooperative approach, however, has some serious limitations. The
most serious limitation is its vulnerability to exploitation by competitive
77. Id. at 84-85.
78. Id. at 86-88.
79. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 41, at 53.
80. Id. According to Williams, cooperative bargainers care more about ethical conduct,
fairness, and personal relationships than do competitive bargainers. Id. at 20. Effective
cooperative negotiators are described as: forthright, trustful, objective, fair-minded, reason-
able, logical (not emotional), courteous, personable, friendly, tactful, sincere, organizing,
wise, careful, etc. Id, at 21-22.
81. This evidence comes largely from game theory. See, e.g. D. LAX & J. SEBENIUS,
supra note 4, at 158-60 (describing Robert Axelrod's studies of the Prisoner's Dilemma
game).
82. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 41, at 53.
93. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 19, at 829.
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negotiators.84 Competitive negotiators may be unwilling to cooperate and
may see cooperative behavior as a sign of weakness that can be used to
their own advantage. When this happens, if the cooperative negotiator
fails to adjust, she may become the "loser" in a win/lose battle. Compet-
itive negotiation seems to overwhelm cooperative negotiation. This prob-
lem is heightened by the fact that competitive strategies are the tradi-
tionally accepted means of negotiation and by the fact that legal
negotiation is carried out under the shadow of the competitive courts and
the competitive law.
The cooperative approach seems more consistent with the traditional
goals of the alternative dispute resolution movement.85 The decreased
likelihood of impasse furthers the goal of lessening the burden on courts
and avoiding the cost and delay of adjudication. The cooperative ap-
proach encourages active party involvement, broadens the range of avail-
able remedies, widens the scope of admissable information, and avoids
the antagonism, inherent in court proceedings, which tends to threaten
the ongoing relationship between the parties. Finally, the cooperative ap-
proach improves the quality of justice by avoiding limited win/lose re-
sults. The cooperative approach thus offers a real alternative to
adjudication.
B. Mediation
Mediation is a method of "third-party dispute resolution."88 Mediation
is negotiation with the aid of a disinterested third party.8" "The media-
tor, in contrast to the judge or arbitrator, has no power to impose an
outcome on disputing parties. Rather, the mediator's function is that of
assisting the parties to reach their own agreement." 88
1. Goals. "[TIhe central quality of mediation [is] its capacity to reo-
rient the parties toward each other, not by imposing rules on them, but
by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their relation-
ship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes and dispositions to-
ward one another."'88 Lon Fuller traced the proper applications of media-
tion in 1971,90 and found that mediation works in many diverse
84. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 41, at 53-54.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
86. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 14, at 91.
87. Fisher & Ury, Principled Negotiation, in S. GOLDBERG. E. GREEN & F. SANDER,
supra note 14, at 93-94.
88. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER. supra note 14, at 91.
89. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL L. REV. 305, 325 (1971).
90. Id. at 309-25.
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situations: "to make the parties aware of the 'social norms' applicable to
their relationship and to persuade them to accommodate themselves to
the 'structure' imposed by these norms;"9' 1 to create social norms; 92 to
bring about "a more harmonious relationship between the parties,
whether this be achieved through explicit agreement, through a recipro-
cal acceptance of the 'social norms' relevant to their relationship, or sim-
ply because the parties have been helped to a new and more perceptive
understanding of one another's problems;"9' 3 or to terminate a relation-
ship.9' Thus, "mediation may be directed toward,-and result in discrep-
ant and even diametrically opposed results."95 Fuller concludes, however,
that mediation should not be used if the parties' relationship is governed
by impersonal, act-oriented rules: for example, the relationship between
the state and its citizens. Fuller thus argues that mediation should not be
used as a method of law enforcement. 96 Mediation is used in a variety of
contexts: labor disputes, family disputes (and disputes between other
parties in ongoing relationships), environmental disputes, community dis-
putes, and interpersonal and minor criminal cases which would otherwise
end in court. 97
2. The Method.
a. Process. The mediator's main purpose is to ensure that the negotia-
tors maintain a cooperative approach to the negotiation. The mediator
can establish the atmosphere necessary for cooperative negotiation to
take place by, for example, "maintaining rules of civilized debate, acting
as a neutral discussion leader, helping to set the agenda, suggesting
processes for negotiations . . .. [encouraging] reticent people . . .to
speak,"9 -and choosing neutral meeting places. The mediator can thus
discourage the manipulative strategies of competitive negotiation and
open up the lines of communication. The mediator can, further, "provide
bargainers with a face-saving means of holding the channels of commu-
nication open while they wait for a better external environment." 99 The
91. Id. at 307-08.
92. Id. at 308.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 308-09.
96. Id. at 327-38.
97. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 14, at 92.
98. H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 108 (1982). See also Fuller,
supra note 89, at 309.
99. H. RAIFFA, supra note 98, at 109.
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mediator can ensure that the negotiators separate the people problems
from the substantive dispute by acting as a neutral filter between the
negotiators. In that position she can separate emotion from information
and enhance communication. 100 She may also, as a neutral party, seem
trustworthy to the negotiators. Thus, she may easily discover the real
interests of the parties and ensure that those interests are used as the
basis for bargaining.10' Because she can see the whole problem, both
sides and all the issues involved, she can more easily create a variety of
workable solutions to the dispute.'02 Finally, as a neutral participant, ob-
jective criteria that she suggests will seem less suspect than they would if
either party suggested them. 103
The mediator thus has a great deal of power to influence the process of
negotiation. She can, in fact, turn what seems like a completely distribu-
tive bargaining situation into an opportunity to create joint gains.'"
There is some debate, however, over how much responsibility the media-
tor should bear over the substance of the final result of bargaining.'0 "
This debate centers on whether the mediator's responsibility is satisfied if
the parties reach an agreement they all find acceptable or whether the
mediator must further ensure that the agreement is fair to all the par-
ties, to third parties, and to the community.' If the mediator's function
includes ensuring substantive fairness, the mediator, throughout the me-
diation process, will have to watch for inequalities of bargaining power
and prevent them from being used to a party's disadvantage. This func-
tion would require the mediator to take an interest in the outcome and
occasionally to take sides during the bargaining process to equalize bar-
gaining power.107
b. Effects. The neutral third-party mediator facilitates cooperative bar-
gaining without taking the ultimate power to reach a solution away from
100. Fisher & Ury, Principled Negotiation, supra note 87, at 93. This is the "separate
the people from the problem" element of cooperative negotiation discussed supra text ac-
companying notes 66-70.
101. Fisher & Ury, Principled Negotiation, supra note 87, at 93. This is the "focus on
interests, not positions" element of cooperative negotiation discussed supra text accompa-
nying notes 66, 71-73.
102. Fisher & Ury, Principled Negotiation, supra note 87, at 94. This is the "generate a
variety of possibilities before deciding what to do" element of cooperative negotiation dis-
cussed supra text accompanying notes 66, 74-76.
103. Fisher & Ury, Principled Negotiation, supra note 87, at 93-94. This is the "insist
that the result be based on some objective standard" element of cooperative negotiation
discussed supra text accompanying notes 66, 77-78.
104. H. RAFFIA, supra note 98, at 219.
105. See The Life of the Mediator: To Be or Not To Be (Accountable), in S.
GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 14, at 108-13.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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the real parties. Thus, like the cooperative approach to negotiation, me-
diation successfully serves many purposes of the alternative dispute reso-
lution movement. 08 However, as I shall discuss below, if ensuring sub-
stantive fairness is not, at least to some extent, a part of the mediator's
function, mediation is not as complete an alternative to adjudication as it
could be.
While I believe mediation has a great deal to offer feminist theory and
practice, it does have some practical drawbacks. In many disputes, par-
ticularly disputes between family members, mediation may be unfair to
women because of their weaker bargaining position.
[I]t fails to provide full protection for individual family members be-
cause, in encouraging agreement between the parties, it may force the
weaker party to accept a resolution that gives her far less than she would be
entitled to in a formal adjudication. Women who try to deal with battering
husbands through [an informal] system may well find themselves the vic-
tims of continued battering. Thus, although the aim of deformalization is
altruism and family solidarity, the actual result is too often the perpetuation
of hierarchy and domination."0 "
Mediation thus fails to help women who are involved in situations of
inequality of power because mediation does not prevent such inequality
outside the mediation session from affecting the proceedings and results
in the mediation session. The function of ensuring substantive fairness,
which I argue that mediators should accept, would do much to keep ine-
qualities of power from adversely affecting the results of mediation.
c. Arbitration. Arbitration is practiced primarily as a private form of
adjudication."10 It has been used as an alternative to judicial adjudica-
tion for hundreds of years."' It allows the disputing parties to decide the
identity of the arbitrator, the standards by which the arbitrator should
make her decision, and the procedures to be used."' Yet once the dis-
pute is briought before the arbitrator, the arbitrator takes control and
makes a final binding decision.
1. Goals. The main benefits of arbitration over judicial adjudication
include the possibility of choosing an arbitrator with expertise in the sub-
ject matter of the dispute, the privacy of the proceedings, the simplicity
and informality of the procedures, the lower cost, and the relative
spreed." 3
108. See supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
109. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REv. 1497, 1542 (1983).
110. See S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 14, at 189-91.
I11. Id. at 189.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 189-90.
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2. Methods.
a. Processes. There are two possible methods of arbitration: the adjudi-
catory approach and the mediatory approach."1 4 The adjudicatory ap-
proach is the one that is most commonly used today.' 5 Under this ap-
proach, the arbitrator serves as "an umpire who should [be concerned]
solely with deciding the grievance. In reaching a decision, the umpire
should not consider which result would benefit the relationship of the
parties." 6 Rather, the arbitrator should act like a court, objectively ap-
plying pre-established procedures and rules. This approach mirrors judi-
cial adjudication on a lesser scale. It reaches similar win/lose results
through similar adversary processes.
The mediatory approach views the primary function of the arbitrator
as furthering the relationship of the parties." 7 The mediator should at-
tempt to help the parties resolve their dispute through mediation. Only if
mediation fails should the arbitrator issue a decision. Further, in reach-
ing a decision, the arbitrator should be "guided primarily by a desire to
further the parties' relationship.""' 8
b. Effects. The adjudicatory approach fails to serve many of the goals
of the alternative dispute resolution movement. It does not meet the
quality-of-justice arguments for alternative dispute resolution because it
focuses on win/lose results. It may also fail to avoid the cost and delay of
litigation. The possibility of winning the grievance "breeds an interest in
'winning,' which, in substantial part, is responsible for the delay, high
cost, and formality that have come to characterize much of arbitra-
tion. . . .""9 This emphasis on winning makes the selection of the arbi-
trator seem crucial to the parties. This causes them to spend a substan-
tial amount of time choosing the arbitrator. 20 This also makes the
parties more willing to pay a high price for the chosen arbitrator."2' It
also makes them more likely to hire an attorney and to insist on formal
transcripts and briefs, thus adding even greater cost and delay. 22
114. Goldberg, The Mediation of Grievances Under a Collective Bargaining Contract:
An Alternative to Arbitration, in S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 14, at
201, 202.
115. Id. at 202.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 203.
120. Id. at 203-04.
121. Id. at 204.
122. Id.
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The effects of the mediatory approach, because it is less commonly
used, are less clear. It seems likely to expand the possibilities for non-
binary results and to decrease cost and delay. In fact, if practiced prop-
erly, it may provide all the benefits of mediation while further reducing
the likelihood of impasse because of the arbitrator's decisionmaking
power. Lon Fuller, 23 however, criticizes this approach because he claims
that the two methods (mediation and arbitration) are irreconcilable. He
argues:
The morality of mediation lies in optimum settlement, a settlement in
which each party gives up what he values less, in return for what he values
more. The morality of arbitration lies in decision according to the law of
contract. The procedures appropriate for mediation are those most likely to
uncover that pattern of adjustment which will most nearly meet the inter-
ests of both parties. The procedures appropriate for arbitration are those
which most securely guarantee each of the parties a meaningful chance to
present arguments and proofs for a decision in his favor. Thus, private con-
sultations with the parties, generally wholly improper on the part of an ar-
bitrator, are an indispensable tool of mediation.
Not only are the appropriate procedures different in the two cases, but
the facts sought by those procedures are different. There is no way to define
"the essential facts" of a situation except by reference to some objective.
Since the objective of reaching an optimum settlement is different from that
of rendering an award according to the contract, the facts relevant in the
two cases are different, or, when they seem the same, are viewed in different
aspects. If a person who has mediated unsuccessfully attempts to assume
the role of arbitrator, he must endeavor to view the facts of the case in a
completely new light, as if he had previously known nothing about them.
This is a difficult thing to do.1 24
Fuller begins with a definition of how arbitration is practiced and ba-
ses his argument on how mediation differs from that method of arbitra-
tion. I want to know why arbitration should be practiced that way. I
want to know why arbitral decisions should be based on less than full
information. I want to know why arbitral results should not contain an
element of optimality. Because I believe Fuller's definition turns arbitra-
tion into a cheaper version of the court system, I would change the defi-
nition. But, even assuming that Fuller's definition is inevitable or un-
changeable, I believe his argument can be answered by changing the
two-step med-arb approach into a two-person approach. A mediator me-
diates and then, if that fails, an arbitrator steps in and arbitrates (or the
arbitrator and mediator arbitrate together or the mediator recommends a
123. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, Proceedings, Fifteenth Annual
Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 8 (1962), reprinted in S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN
& F. SANDER, supra note 14, at 247.
124. Id. at 248.
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decision to the arbitrator). 25 This minor change gives parties the bene-
fits of both procedures while avoiding the overlap that Fuller finds
objectionable.
IV. FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
This section will describe some principles of feminist theory. It will
concentrate mostly on Catherine MacKinnon's dominance theory of gen-
der hierarchy1 26 and on Carol Gilligan's psychological theory of women's
development. 27 It will focus on the feminist attempt to make our society
take women's experience into account, and the ways our society and our
legal system obstruct this attempt.
A. Objectivity as the Male Perspective
Catherine MacKinnon has attempted to create a feminist theory of the
state and the law.' 28 One central principle of her theory is the idea that
the objective perspective is really a male perspective. 129 MacKinnon's
theory is based on the fact that males have historically created and con-
trolled our society. 130 This controlling position has given males the power
to define "reality" according to men's subjective experience and to im-
pose that definition of "reality" on the world."' Men have used this
125. See Goldberg, The Mediation of Grievances Under a Collective Bargaining Con-
tract: An Alternative to Arbitration, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 270 (1982).
126. C. MACKINNON. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 7; MacKinnon, Toward Femi-
nist Jurisprudence, supra note 7; MacKinnon, Agenda, supra note 1I.
127. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 8.
128. See MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 7; C. MAcKINNON.
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 7. I use only parts of MacKinnon's complete feminist
theory of society.
129. For discussions of what the male perspective entails, see infra notes 156-60 and
175-91 and accompanying text.
130. MacKinnon describes her view of how men came to have control in FEMINISM UN-
MODIFIED, supra note 7, at 40.
131. I enclose the word "reality" in quotation marks here because I am trying to indi-
cate that our society's views of "reality" is not universal or natural or objective or true. It is
socially created and defined. True reality (no quotation marks) depends on perspective. It is
subjective experience. Thus, there are such things as male reality and female reality (and
black reality, and individual, personal reality), and they are not the same, but they are all
equally real, legitimate, or true. This is difficult to explain, because I am trying to redefine,
or at least un-define, already-defined words so that there will be room in them for women's
experience. I fear it will not get any easier as women go on to try to explain what our
experience is in male terms. This difficulty does illustrate the exclusiveness of our language;
it very successfully thwarts attempts to open it up and make it include new experience.
Creating more flexible language may be a crucial task for feminism, because "[w]omen
have been deprived ... of terms of our own in which to express our lives. ... C. MAC-
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power to make their subjective experience the only recognized "real-
ity.' 1 32 Women's subjective experience, as women live it and describe it,
has been left out and classified as "unreal." Rather than recognizing
women's subjective experience as equally real and valid, men have rede-
fined women to fit male "reality," marking as "unreal" anything which
does not fit neatly into male "reality." The male perspective has thus
become the standard against which women and the world are measured;
that is, the male subjective perspective has become the "objective," the
only, standard, while the female subjective perspective has been dis-
counted because of its subjectivity. Male society has thus taken male
subjective experience and defined it as "real," abstract, universal, and
objective (i.e., as truth). Further, it has taken women's subjective experi-
ence and (when it has not ignored women's experience completely) de-
fined it as "unreal," specific, exceptional, and subjective (i.e., as un-
truth).133  Then male society forced women to live within those
definitions.134 Thus, as MacKinnon states:
KINNON. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 7, at 15. See also Scales, The Emergence of
Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. -1373, 1388 (1986) ("Feminist method
stresses that the mechanisms of law-language, rules, and categories-are all merely
means for economy in thought and communication. They make it possible for us to imple-
ment justice without reinventing every wheel at every turn. But we must not let means turn
into ends. When those mechanisms obscure our vision of the ends of law, they must be
revised or ignored. Sometimes we must take the long route in order to get where we really
need to be.").
132. See Scales, supra note 131, at 1383 ("Paradigmatic male values, like objectivity,
are defined as exclusive, identified by their presumed opposites. Those values cannot be
content with multiplicity; they create the other and then devour it. Objectivity ignores con-
text; reason is the opposite of emotion; rights preclude care.").
133. Id. at 1377 ("[A]bstract universality ...made maleness the norm of what is
human, and did so sub rosa, all in the name of neutrality.").
134. In MacKinnon's words:
"[T]he male point of view has forced itself upon the world, and does force itself upon the
world, as its way of knowing." C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 7, at
50.
"Women say: 'We want to be taken on our own terms.' Male-supremacist logic trans-
forms that to: 'You want to be treated as a woman,' and men define what a woman is."
1984 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the
Law - A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, at 24 (1985) (Catherine MacKinnon
speaking).
-[M]en are as different from women as women are from men, but socially the sexes are
not equally powerful." C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 7, at 42.
"[Tlhe white man's standard for equality is: are you equal to him? That is hardly a
neutral standard. It is a racist, sexist standard." Id. at 65.
We notice in language as well as in life that the male occupies both the neutral and the
male position. This is another way of saying that the neutrality of objectivity and of male-
ness are coextensive linguistically, whereas women occupy the marked, the gendered, the
different, the forever-female position.
C. MACKINNON. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 7, at 55.
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[M]ale dominance is perhaps the most pervasive and tenacious system
of power in history [and] it is metaphysically nearly perfect. Its point of
view is the standard for point-of-viewlessness, its particularly the mean-
ing of universality. Its force is exercised as consent, its authority as par-
ticipation, its supremacy as the paradigm of order, its control as the defi-
nition of legitimacy.1 35
MacKinnon gives several examples of contexts in which women's expe-
rience is treated as irrelevant. Rape law is one major example. "The
crime of rape ... is [legally] defined around penetration." 3 Yet pene-
tration is not the harm of rape from the woman's point of view. For
women, penetration is a central element of intercourse, not just of rape.
Rape is a violation of the woman's self, her personhood, and her soul, not
just her body. A rapist takes away the woman's control over her body
and her life and overrides her will, thus attacking her personhood. An-
other element of the legal definition of rape is force. Yet, "[the level of
force is not adjudicated at [the woman's] point of violation; it is adjudi-
cated at the standard of the normal level of force." ' 7 "A rape victim has
"Think about it like those anatomy models in medical school. A male body is the human
body; all those those extra things women have are studied in ob/gyn." Id. at 34.
[Wlomen as such ... [have not], under any doctrinal guise, defined the terms of
discourse or the standards of judgement from women's standpoint. Women athletes
or academics or military women may be allowed to play with the boys, but we are
not allowed to criticize competition or strength or profitably as the standard for
athletes, to question objectivity as a measure of intellectual excellence or abstraction
as the point of scholarship, nor are we allowed to reject combat as a peculiarly
ejaculatory means of conflict resolution.
14. at 74.
The perspective from the male standpoint enforces woman's definition, encircles
her body, circumlocutes her speech, and describes her life. The male perspective is
systemic and hegemonic. The content of the signification "woman" is the content of
women's lives. Each sex has its role, but their stakes and power are not equal. If the
sexes are unequal, and perspective participates in situation, there is no ungendered
reality or no ungendered perspective. And they are connected. In this context, objec-
tivity-the nonsituated, universal standpoint, whether claimed or aspired to-is a
denial of the existence or potency of sex inequality that tacitly participates in con-
structing reality from the dominant point of view. Objectivity, as the epistomologi-
cal stance of which objectification is the social process, creates the reality it appre-
hends by defining as knowledge the reality it creates through its way of
apprehending it.
MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 7, at 636.
Because [the male standpoint] is the dominant point of view and defines rational-
ity, women are pushed to see reality in its terms, although this denies their vantage
point as women in that it contradicts (at least some of) their lived experience.
Women who adopt the male standpoint are passing, epistomologically speaking.
This is not uncommon and it is rewarded.
Id. at 636 n.3.
135. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 7, at 638-39.
136. C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 7, at 87.
137. Id. at 88.
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to prove that it was not intercourse. She has to show that there was force
and she resisted, because if there was sex, consent is inferred. Finders of
fact look for 'more force than usual during the preliminaries.' "138
Women feel violated when they unwillingly submit to intercourse, even if
the method used to coerce them to submit was somewhat lower than
"normal" physical force.
Willing consent, not physical force, marks the line between intercourse
and rape for women. And consent is coerced at a point far below deadly
physical force. Consent is a matter of desire and free will. Consent is
thus, to some extent, a subjective standard. The law will not accept
women's subjective experience as a standard because that would require
believing what women as women say. The law prefers to take the wo-
man's style of dress, her sexual history, her familiarity with her attacker
(husbands, boyfriends, dates, and even acquaintances are more difficult
to convict than complete strangers), and the race of her attacker (men of
color are easier to convict than white rapists) as evidence of consent.
Sexual harassment is another example.
The way the analysis of sexual harassment is sometimes expressed now
.. is that it is an abuse of power, not sexuality.... Power is employer/
employee.., because this is a recognized hierarchy. Among men. Power
is teacher/student, because courts recognize a hierarchy there. Power is
on one side and sexuality on the other. Sexuality is ordinary affection,
everyday flirtation. Only when ordinary, everyday affection and flirta-
tion... come into the context of another hierarchy is it considered poten-
tially an abuse of power. What is not considered to be a hierarchy is
women and men-men on top and women on the bottom. That is not
considered to be a question of power or social hierarchy, legally or
politically. 39
This analysis makes it "difficult to see [situations of coequal
power-- among coworkers or students or teachers] as examples of sexual
harassment."' 140 Yet for women, sexual relations are matters of power -
men's political, financial, physical, and social power over women. Thus,
sexual harassment by a coworker or fellow student or fellow teacher is,
for a woman, still sexual harassment.
The argument over abortion is another example. According to Mac-
Kinnon, liberals support abortion as the equivalent of the no-duty-to-res-
cue rule in tort doctrine, "as if the woman just happened on the fe-
tus."1" The political right urges abstinence. And opponents of state
138. Id.
139. Id. at 89.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 94.
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funding of abortions "make exceptions for those special occasions during
which they presume women did not control sex." 42 They all base their
arguments on the assumption that women generally do control sex.
MacKinnon argues that this assumption is incorrect. Rather, "women
feel compelled to preserve the appearance-which, acted upon, becomes
the reality-of male direction of sexual expression." 4 Women feel they
cannot interrupt intercourse for birth control or for lack of desire. Sexual
intercourse and its consequences are not voluntary for women. Thus, ar-
guments for and against abortion based on the voluntariness of inter-
course and pregnancy fail to take women's experience into account.
The point of this societal analysis for feminist legal theory is that the
objective stance to which the law and the courts aspire is a male stance.
It is created and controlled primarily by men. It is defined exclusively
according to male subjective experience. Yet it is treated as abstract,
universal, and point-of-viewless.1 44 It fails to take women's subjective, yet
shared, experience into account. "[T]he attempt to be objective and neu-
tral avoids owning up to the fact that women [and men] do have . . .
specific point[s] of view .... 45
Why is objectivity as a stance specifically male? First of all, familiar
to all of you is the social specificity, the particularity, the social situated-
ness of thought. Social situation is expressed through the concepts people
construct to make sense of their situation. [Gender is] one such social
situation .... [Therefore,] theories constructed by those with the social
experience of men, most particularly by those who are not conscious that
gender is a specific social circumstance, will be, at the least, open to
being male theories. It would be difficult, it would take a lot of conscious
effort, for them not to be ....
Objectivity is a stance only a subject can take .... It is only a subject
who gets to take the objective standpoint, the stance which is transparent
to its object, the stance that is no stance. A subject is a self. An object is
other to that self. . . . [I]t is men socially who are subjects, women so-
cially who are other, objects. Thus the one who has the social access to
being that self which takes the stance that is allowed to be objective, that
objective person who is subject, is socially male.4"
The state uses law to institutionalize male perspective and male
power.147 By applying objective male standards and procedures "[the
142. Id.
143. Id. at 95.
144. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 7, at 638-39.
145. C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 7, at 86.
146. Id. at 54-55.
147. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 7, at 645.
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law sees and treats women the way men see and treat women. '148 The
law and the legal system's objective stance forces women to meet male
standards, either the male standard of "male" or the male standard of
"female."' 49 Women's subjective experience has no place in these male
standards. Thus, these objective standards are not real for women and
women's subjective experience is not "real" according to these objective
standards. Substantively, then, the law institutionalizes the male
perspective.
Further, because objectivity reflects the male view of current, male-
dominated society, the law legitimizes the way things are. 50 "[Objectiv-
ity] ensures that the law will . . . reinforce existing distributions of
power . ." . As long as legal rationality is measured by objectivity,
"what counts as reason will be that which corresponds to the way things
are. Practical will mean that which can be done without changing any-
thing."'15 Real social change is difficult under such an objective system.
The law thus institutionalizes male power in society.
Finally, the objectivity of law insulates male power in the legal system
because "[s]uch law not only reflects a society in which men rule women;
it [also] rules in a male way. . ."53 Abstract, universal objectivity re-
quires law to be impersonal, to use general rules. General, objective rules
do not allow consideration of subjective experience. Because women's ex-
perience is defined as subjective, and therefore banned from participation
in objective rules, women cannot participate as women in the legal sys-
tem, either as parties or as lawyers.'15 In order to participate, women
must frame their legal arguments according to men's experience. This
clearly reinforces male power in the legal system both by immunizing
148. Id. at 644.
149. Id. For a discussion of what the male standards of "male" qnd "female" entail, see
C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 7, at 70-77.
150. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 7, at 644-45.
151. Id. at 645.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Law is supposed to be rational, objective, abstract and principled, like men; it is not
supposed to be irrational, subjective, contextualized or personalized like women. The social,
political and intellectual practices that constitute "law" were for many years carried out
almost exclusively by men. Given that women were long excluded from the practice of law,
it should not be surprising that the traits associated with women are not greatly valued by
law. Moreover, in a kind of vicious cycle, the "maleness" of law was used as a justification
for excluding women from practicing law. While the number of women in law has been
rapidly increasing, the field continues to be heavily male dominated.
F. OLSEN. THE SEX OF LAW (as quoted in Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice:
Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 39, at 44
(1985)).
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substantive laws from the challenge of women's perspective and by im-
munizing legal practice from the participation of women as women.155
Now, what is the male subjective perspective, the perspective that is
defined as "reality?" Largely, it flows from the experience that men
share - the experience of being on top, in control, superior, and "true."
Similarly, the female subjective perspective flows from the experience of
being on the bottom, controlled, inferior, and "untrue." 156 Women's ex-
perience in today's society thus makes women's viewpoint the perspective
of the victim. This viewpoint is not monolithic. Different women have
different experiences and feelings.157 But there are some shared elements:
we are all judged by male standards, we are all subordinated to men, and
our voices as women are forcibly silenced.158 What women's perspective
would be if we were not at the bottom of a male society is unknown. 59
MacKinnon argues:
[W]e have no idea what women as women would have to say. I'm evok-
ing for women a role we have yet to make, in the name of a voice that,
unsilenced, might say something that have never been heard .... In the
legal world of win and lose, where success is measured by other people's
failures, in this world of kicking or getting kicked, I want to say: there is
another way.160
155. This argument is inspired by, although not expressly made in, Scales, supra note
131.
156. How do you know when a group is on the bottom? It may be some indication when
tley can be assaulted, and authorities ignore them; physically abused, and people turn
away or find it entertaining; economically deprived, and it is seen as all they are worth;
nade the object of jokes, and few ask what makes the jokes funny; imaged as animallike,
cqnfined to a narrow range of tasks and functions, and told it is all harmless or inevitable
and even for their benefit as well as the best they can expect, given what they are. These
are all true for women. In addition, we are excluded from inner circles and then rejected
because we don't know the inside story; told we can't think and had our thoughts appropri-
ated for the advancement of others; told the pedestal is real and called ungrateful and
lacking in initiative when we call it a cage; and blamed for creating our conditions when we
*esist them. When a few of us overcome all this, we are told we show there are no barriers
there and are used as examples to put other women down. She made it - why can't you?
We are used as tokens while every problem we share is treated as a special case.
C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 7, at 30-31.
157. Id. at 76. ("[A]I women are not the same. That's what they think - all women
are the same.").
158. See id. at 75-76.
159. And men's perspective, as well, because male perspective is influenced as much by
the fact that men are on "top" as female perspective is by the fact that women are on the
"bottom."
160. C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 7, at 77.
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B. The Silent Voice
Carol Gilligan has created a feminist theory of women's moral and
psychological perspective. 61 Although this theory has been criticized by
some feminists as a dangerous glorification of women's victim perspec-
tive,162 1 believe it has validity and, if not used as a prescription for what
women should be or as a validation of the way things are, it can help
feminists "remake society so that women can live here .... 163
Gilligan's study began when she noticed "that women had been left
out of ... psychology research samples."'' "Psychological theorists [had
thus] fallen ... into the same observational bias. Implicitly adopting the
male life as the norm, they [had] tried to fashion women out of a mascu-
line cloth."' 65 Gilligan, therefore, began studying women's moral devel-
opment and comparing it to existing psychological theory. This study led
her to recognize that women's perspective differs from men's: women
speak "in a different voice."' 6
Gilligan's observations about psychological theory support MacKin-
non's idea that women's experience, as women live it, is suppressed in
our male society and that society has, instead, defined women according
to male standards.
[S]ince it is difficult to say "different" without saying "better" or
"'worse," since there is a tendency'to construct a single scale of measure-
ment, and since that scale has generally been derived from and standard-
ized on the basis of men's interpretations of research data drawn pre-
dominately or exclusively from studies of males, psychologists "have
tended to regard male behavior as the 'norm' and female behavior as
some kind of deviation from that norm." Thus, when women do not con-
form to the standards of psychological expectation, the conclusion has
generally been that something is wrong with the women.' 67
Gilligan, further, seems to agree with MacKinnon that women's differ-
ent voice is a product, not of biology, but of society; that it is the voice of
the victim. Gilligan argues that society not only defines the qualities of
adulthood according to a male standard, but also discourages women
161. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 8.
162. See, e.g., 1984 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, supra note 134, at 27-28
(Catherine MacKinnon speaking); Scales, supra note 131, at 1380-84 (arguing that Gilli-
gan's work could become "the Uncle Tom's Cabin of our Century." Id. at 1381).
163. C. MACKINNON. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 7, at 16.
164. 1984 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, supra note 134, at 39 (Carol Gilligan
speaking).
165. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 8, at 6.
166. Id. at 1-4.
167. Id. at 14 (citation omitted) (quoting D.C. MCCLELLAND, POWER: THE INNER Ex-
PERIENCE (1975)).
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from pursuing those qualities in ourselves. 68 "[T]he very traits that tra-
ditionally have defined the 'goodness' of women, their care for and sensi-
tivity to the needs of others, are those that mark them as deficient in
moral development."16 9 Society thus forces women to take the "differ-
ent" and "worse" position. Unlike MacKinnon, however, Gilligan does
not argue that women should change. She does not focus on how women
can find out what our perspective would be if we were not victims.
Rather, she argues that society should recognize the male definition of
"adulthood ... is itself out of balance." 70 By favoring the male perspec-
tive to the exclusion of the female view, society loses something very
valuable: the female voice.
While I believe Gilligan's argument is valuable in remaking society so
that women can live here now, others fear that it may sacrifice women's
long-term success in becoming what we could be if we were not society's
victims. For MacKinnon, for example, Gilligan's call for recognition of
women's current perspective leaves unjustifiable male dominance in
place, simply somewhat modified.17 ' For Ann Scales, Gilligan's argu-
ment is in danger of becoming just another stereotype, another tool of
male society used to keep women in our place.1 72 While I agree with
MacKinnon that Gilligan's theory does not attack the origins of the vic-
timization of women, I believe that those origins are so deeply buried in
societal history that seeking to change them from the roots-is largely
futile. Thus, although I believe MacKinnon's work in exposing those
roots and their ugly results and in showing us that society could have
grown differently (the way things are is not inevitable or natural), I be-
lieve Gilligan's thesis is a very productive means for changing society
now. After all, we must begin our journey from where we are, not from
where we might have been or from where we were many centuries ago. I
also agree with Scales that Gilligan's description of a female voice car-
ries real risks. For example, because the female voice is the result, not of
nature, but of socialization, encouraging women to take this voice as our
168. Id. at 17.
169. Id. at 18.
170. Id. at 17.
171. See 1984 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, supra note 134, at 27-28 (Cathe-
rine MacKinnon speaking); C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 7, at 38-
39. Thus MacKinnon's argument against Gilligan's thesis is that it does not go far enough:
it does not attack the root of the problem.
172. See Scales, supra note 131, at 1380-83. Scales believes that the male perspective is
inherently unable to accept multiplicity. Male definitions are based on their lesser opposites
and male definitions do not allow blending of opposites. Therefore, male society will never
be able to recognize and accept the value of the female perspective. Id. at 1383. Thus, for
Scales, the problem with Gilligan's argument is that it will not work and it will be used by
male society as a weapon against women.
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own carries the risk of forcing women into yet another artificial, un-
chosen life-definition. Also, characierizing the different perspective as
"female" raises arguments that society should not accommodate it be-
cause that would entail privileging women over "other people." Such ar-
guments rarely acknowledge that- those "other people" are men, who
have always been privileged over women. Gilligan's female voice also
risks turning jobs where the elements of that perspective are particularly
valuable into "women's work." Jobs that are so characterized tend to be
filled primarily by women and these women receive lower pay and less
respect for their work than do workers in related "men's" jobs.173 There-
fore, we must claim the credit for this voice, and we must be careful to
characterize this perspective as an alternative and better perspective,
rather than purely as a "female," (which, in today's society implies "in-
ferior," "subjective," or "minority") perspective. We must insist that
men as well as women take this perspective in all their endeavors. This
will help women. to create terms with which to express our lives and will
help us to succeed personally and financially on our own terms. Used in
this way, Gilligan's theory is useful as a first step toward remaking
society.
Although what we should do with this information is thus in some
doubt, Gilligan has, at least, given us some idea of women's current per-
spective.1" She has also shown that the male perspective and the female
perspective are not necessarily irreconcilable. This section will now dis-
cuss Gilligan's findings.
The most useful part of Gilligan's study for my purposes is her study
of Amy and Jake. Amy and Jake are two eleven-year-old children in the
same sixth-grade class. They were each asked to resolve a dilemma in
which "a man named Heinz considers whether or not to steal a drug
which he cannot afford to buy in order to save the life of his wife."' 75
Heinz's dilemma evokes very different responses from the two children:
Jake . . . is clear from the outset that Heinz should steal the drug.
Constructing the dilemma... as a conflict between the values of property
and life, he discerns the logical priority of life and uses logic to justify
his choice:
'For one thing, a human life is worth more than money, and if the
druggist only makes $1,000, he is still-going to live, but if Heinz doesn't
173. Examples- of this phenomenon include the nursing profession (as opposed- to the
..medical" profession) and cooking (as opposed to being a "chef"). If alternative dispute
resolution, for example, came to be characterized as a woman's profession, its practitioners
might come to be lower-paid and less respected than "real" lawyers and "real" judges.
174. Note, however, that not- all women share this perspective and that not only women
use this voice.
175. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 8, at 25.
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steal the drug, his wife is going to die. (Why is life worth more than
money?) Because the druggist can get a thousand dollars later from rich
people with cancer, but Heinz can't get his wife again. (Why not?) Be-
cause people are all different and so you couldn't get Heinz's wife
again."
Asked whether Heinz should steal the drug if he does not love his
wife, Jake replies that he should, say that not only is their "a difference
between hating and killing," but also, if Heinz were caught, "the judge
would probably think that it was the right thing to do." Asked about the
fact that, in stealing, Heinz would be breaking the law, he says that "the
laws have mistakes, and you can't go writing up a law for everything
that you can imagine. '176
In contrast, Amy's response to the dilemma conveys a very different
impression...:
'Well, I don't think [Heinz should steal the drug]. I think that there
might be other ways besides stealing it, like if he could borrow the
money or make a loan or something, but he really shouldn't steal the
drug - but his wife shouldn't die either.'
Asked why he should or should not steal the drug, she considers
neither property nor law but rather the effect that theft could have on
the relationship between Heinz and his wife:
'If he stole the drug, he might save the life of his wife then, but if he
did, he might have to go to jail, and then his wife might get sicker again,
and he couldn't get more of the drug, and it might not be good. So they
should really just talk it out and find some other way to make the
money.'
[S]ince Amy's moral judgment is grounded in the belief that, "if
somebody has something that would keep somebody alive, then it's not
right not to give it to them," she considers the problem in the dilemma to
arise not from the druggist's assertion of rights but from his failure of
response. 7
From these and other responses, Gilligan surmises that the male voice
expresses a "morality of rights,' 7 8 while the female voice expresses an
"ethic of care."'17 The male perspective sees moral dilemmas as present-
ing problems of logic, law, and rights. The male perspective treats such
dilemmas in an abstract, impersonal, objective manner. The male voice
solves the problem by applying a hierarchy of rights.' 80 This perspective
176. Id. at 26.
177. Id. at 27-28.
178. Id. at 164.
179. Id. at 30.
180. Id. at 26-63.
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allows Jake to solve Heinz's dilemma like "a math problem with
humans"""1 and reach a certain, final decision with which he is confident
a judge would agree. 1 2
The female perspective, however, sees Heinz's dilemma as "a narrative
of relationships that extends over time."' 83 The female voice questions
the question: Amy wants more facts and questions her position as deci-
sionmaker. The female perspective sees the people in hypothetical moral
dilemmas as real and as connected, rather than as imaginary, atomistic
individuals. The female voice seeks to maintain the connection, rather
than to choose between the individuals.' The female perspective sees
the solution in using communication to activate the network of relation-
ships that connects the people, rather than in applying a hierarchy of
abstract principles. This perspective leads Amy to put her faith in the
people themselves to resolve the dilemma. She is as certain that they will
live up to her expectations as Jake is that a judge would agree with his
logic.' 85 Amy is, however, less certain of the final solution, because she
tries to keep everyone's interest in mind - those of Heinz, the druggist,
and the wife - and because she sees a variety of possible solutions rather
than just the single choice.
The differences in these two perspectives become clear as they are
played out in many aspects of life and thought. For example, people who
take the male perspective define themselves through the separation from
others and measure themselves against an abstract ideal of perfection,
while people who take the female perspective define themselves through
connection and measure themselves according to their particular activi-
ties of care.' 8 The male perspective takes responsibility to the self for
granted and understands responsibility to others to entail limiting inter-
ference with those others.'87 For the female perspective, on the other
hand, "responsibility signifies response, an extension rather than a limi-
tation of action. Thus it connotes an act of care rather than the restraint
of aggression."'88 The female perspective also tends to put others before
the self in determining to whom responsibility is owed. 89 The male per-
spective "depict[s] a world of dangerous confrontation and explosive con-
nection, where [the female perspective] sees a world of care and protec-
181. Id. at 28.
182. Id. at 26 and 29.
183. Id. at 28.
184. Id. at 28-63.
185. Id. at 29.
186. Id. at 35.
187. Id. at 37-38.
188. Id. at 38.
189. Id. at 39
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tion, a life lived with others whom 'you may love as much or even more
than you love yourself.' ," These differing views of the world led men in
Gilligan's study to see violence in situations of personal affiliation and led
women to see violence in impersonal situations of achievement and
competition."'
While society recognizes, validates, and encourages the male voice, it
discounts and silences the female one. The interviewer's reaction to
Amy's response to Heinz's dilemma illustrates how this silencing works.
"[A]s the interviewer conveys through the repetition of questions that
the answers she gave were not heard or not right, Amy's confidence be-
gins to diminish and her replies become more constrained and un-
sure."1 2 "[W]hile [Jake's] assumptions about [the impossibility of]
agreement are confirmed by the convergence in logic between his an-
swers and the questions posed, [Amy's] assumptions are belied by the
failure of communication, the interviewer's inability to understand her
response."' 0 3 As they grow up, people who speak in the female voice
learn to adopt the male voice in order to satisfy society's expectations.
By age fifteen, Amy still feels the same way about Heinz's dilemma:
"The whole situation is unreal."1' But she is beginning to play society's
game. She finishes her response by adopting Jake's answer because she
now knows that Jake's answer, despite the tension and uncertainty it cre-
ates in her, is the "right" answer in society; only Jake's answer will gain
societal approval." 5 By age nineteen, women like Amy "have developed
an acute tendency toward self-doubt and self-questioning. There was a
kind of hesitation among [these] women, and even a kind of disbelief in
their own ability to talk about reality.. . . [They tended to ask]: 'Would
you like to know what I think, or would you like to know what I really
think?' ... [They] had learned to 'think' in a way that was very different
from the way that [they] 'really thought.' "9' Society, by accepting the
male voice, forces the female voice into tense silence. "As we have lis-
tened for centuries to the voices of men and the theories of development
that their experience informs, so we have come more recently to notice
not only the silence of women but the difficulty in hearing what they say
when they speak.' 097
190. Id. at 38.
191. Id. at 39-45.
192. Id. at 28-29.
193. Id. at 29.
194. 1984 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, supra note 134, at 41 (Carol Gilligan
speaking).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 40.
197. C.-GILLIGAN, supra note 8, at 173.
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Gilligan's study shows that legal education and practice also further
this process of silencing the female voice. Hilary, a lawyer who partici-
pated in Gilligan's study, faced the silencing effect of legal practice when
opposing counsel in a trial overlooked a document critical to his client's
case. 198 In deciding she could not tell her opponent about the document,
"Hilary realized that the adversary system of justice impedes not only
'the supposed search for truth' but also the expression of concern for the
person on the other side." 191 "[T]he concept of rights [is] in tension with
an ethic of care" 200 and the adversary system forces Hilary to speak in
terms of the morality of rights and to suppress her own voice of care.
"The adversarial system can not easily accommodate two perspectives
which are in fundamental tension with each other. There is a wish to
resolve or reduce ambiguity, to arrive a certainty, and that is done by
eliminating one perspective or the other. 201
Gilligan argues that this silencing of the female voice is harmful, not
only to the people who experience it, but also to society as a whole. Ac-
cording to Gilligan, the exclusivity of the male perspective harms both
men and women, because "[m]ost people use both voices. 20 2 It also
harms society because, by excluding the female voice, the male perspec-
tive limits its focus. It defines its problems too narrowly. It limits the
types of processes available to solve those problems. And it limits the
available solutions to those problems. The male perspective thus asks the
wrong questions and suggests incomplete and uncreative solutions. "[I]n
the different voice of women lies the truth of an ethic of care, the tie
between relationship and responsibility, and the origins of aggression in
the failure of connection. 203
Gilligan, therefore, seeks an inclusive society, which will change the
way society approaches its problems. Gilligan gives us an example of an
inclusive solution to the tension between the male and female
perspectives:
[T]wo four-year-olds ...were playing together and wanted to play
different games. The girl said: "Let's play next- door-neighbors." The
boy said: "I want to play pirates." "Okay," said the girl, "then you can
be the pirate who lives next door." She has reached ...an inclusive
solution rather than a fair solution - the fair solution would be to take
turns and play each game for an equal period . . . .Each child would
198. Id. at 135.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 136.
201. 1984 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, supra note 134, at 48 (Carol Gilligan
speaking).
202. Id. at 47.
203. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 8, at 173.
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enter the other's imaginative world. The girl would learn about the world
of pirates and the boy would learn about the world of neighbors .... But
... neither game would change - the pirate game would stay the pirate
game, and the neighbor game would stay the neighbor game ....
Now look what happens in ... the inclusive solution. By bringing a
pirate into the neighborhood, both the pirate game and the neighbor
game change. In addition, the pirate neighbor game, the combined game,
is a game that neither child had separately imagined. In other words, a
new game arises through the relationship."'
The two children create the new game together, create the rules of
play together, and explore the possible resolutions together. This inclu-
sive approach allows greater creativity in society and keeps the one voice
from overwhelming and silencing the other. It allows society to meet the
needs of both perspectives without compromising.' 5
V. THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Feminist jurisprudence has important implications both for adjudica-
tion and for the alternative dispute resolution movement. Feminist the-
ory's criticisms of objectivity, adverseness, abstract rights, and hierarchy
as males suggest that the legal system as it currently works offers little
hope to women. The conflict resolution methods offered by the alterna-
tive dispute resolution movement, on the other hand, offer a great deal of
hope. Unfortunately, the movement has adopted many of the elements of
the adversary system that feminist theory has criticized. Now feminists'
hope lies in reversing this trend.
A. Negotiation
Negotiation offers a great deal to feminists who want to inject a fe-
male perspective into the process of dispute resolution. Negotiation has
the potential to remove disputes from the rigid hierarchy of the courts, to
limit adverseness and competition, to contextualize rather than abstract
disputants' interests, and to avoid male objectivity by allowing female
voices to be heard. This potential can improve both the process and the
results of conflict resolution by encouraging direct dialogue between
voices and by facilitating inclusive solutions to problems.
204. 1984 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, supra note 134, at 45 (Carol Gilligan
speaking).
205. Id: at 54.
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1. The Competitive Approach. As applied under the competitive ap-
proach, negotiation fails to achieve its potential. The competitive ap-
proach assumes the disputing parties are competing over the same lim-
ited and equally valued items and, therefore, that success is measured by
maximum individual gain."'6 The parties to a competitive negotiation
battle their way along a linear field until either they both compromise
somewhere between their original positions or until one wins and the
other concedes defeat. The battle is conducted largely through tactics of
manipulation, intimidation, and deceit.
This process completely excludes the concerns of the female voice. Ad-
versarial battling is inherently inconsistent with the ethic of care. It ex-
cludes the relationship between the parties, a central concern of the fe-
male perspective, from consideration. By measuring success in terms of
beating the other, adversarial battling discourages either side from seek-
ing to meet the needs of the other. The tactics recommended for this
battle discourage the process of open communication on which the fe-
male perspective and feminism, in its emphasis on consciousness-raising,
relies in seeking truth. By emphasizing competition, competitive negotia-
tion stifles communication and encourages argument. The competitive
approach may also discourage participation by the actual parties to the
conflict, thus defeating the female perspective's goal of inclusion of vary-
ing perspectives.
The female perspective also challenges the assumptions of the compet-
itive approach to negotiation. The female perspective fights the assump-
tion that different people want the same things and value those things
equally and exclusively. The female perspective insists that this assump-
tion be proved.20 7
The female perspective challenges the limitations the competitive ap-
proach places on solutions to disputes. By encouraging position-taking
and solutions lying along a linear field between the positions, the compet-
itive approach discourages exploration of creative, inplusive solutions 208
that seek to satisfy all the parties' interests, even those interests which do
not fit within traditional assumptions about value. The female perspec-
tive does not easily accept narrowing or exclusive constructions of
problems. It looks beyond the straight-line, traditional, positioning ap-
proach to problems in its search for truth.
The female perspective also challenges the emphasis on winning that
characterizes the competitive approach. The female perspective focuses
on meeting the parties' needs rather than on winning and losing and on
206. Nlenkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, supra note 154, at 51.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 183-85.
208. Carol Gilligan's "pirate-neighbor" game is one such creative, inclusive solution.
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maintaining good relationships rather than on parties "beating" each
other.
The competitive approach thus conflicts with the female perspective.
In addition, the competitive approach contributes to the silencing of
women's voices, as women, in the practice of law. Some evidence sug-
gests that women bargain less competitively than men do.2 0 9 Women's
more accommodating approach may make women less successful, less
likely to "win," at competitive negotiation than men. Thus, the competi-
tive approach not only threatens the female voice in society but also
threatens to silence individual women's voices in the practice of law.
2. The Cooperative Approach. The cooperative approach to negotia-
tion leaves a great deal more room for the female perspective than does
the competitive approach. The cooperative approach thus comes much
closer to achieving its potential than does the competitive approach. It
does, however, have some serious limitations.
The cooperative approach focuses on communication rather than com-
petition, and therefore poses less threat to the relationships between the
parties and between the negotiators. The cooperative approach is consis-
tent with the female perspective's emphasis on direct, open communica-
tion and relationships. The cooperative approach may also encourage
greater participation by the actual parties to the dispute, thus furthering
the female perspective's goal of inclusion.
The cooperative approach, by focusing on creating value, refuses to
assume that the parties value the same things equally and exclusively. It
allows negotiators to seek the parties' real interests by looking beyond
traditional assumptions about value. The cooperative approach is thus
consistent with the female perspective's insistence on considering context
rather than abstract general assumptions. This broad focus also more
easily allows women's experience, as it is reflected in our valuation, to be
taken into account, even when it does not fit within abstract, traditional
"reality." The cooperative approach's broad, nonlinear approach also en-
courages creative, inclusive solutions that meet the parties' real needs.
Further, the cooperative approach may enable women to speak in our
own voices, both in society, by giving women a forum for our own ex-
pression of our own experience, and in legal practice, by adding to our
personal sense of success in that practice. The cooperative approach may
thus help feminism transform the legal profession.
However, the cooperative approach is limited, from the feminist per-
spective, by its insistence on using objective criteria. As Catherine
209. See J. RUBIN & B. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGO-
TIATION 171 (1975).
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MacKinnon's analysis suggests, the objective stance is the male perspec-
tive. Objective criteria, such as the law, have been defined by men ac-
cording to male experience. They, therefore, often favor men and exclude
the experience of women. Such criteria force women to live, and to nego-
tiate, according to standards we had no part in creating or interpreting.
Thus, although such objective criteria are useful, they must be carefully
examined and, whenever necessary, modified to take women's experience
into account or discarded.
The cooperative approach is further limited by its vulnerability to
abuse by competitive bargainers. The male perspective has traditionally
seen the female perspective as weak and irrelevant and has increased its
attempts to smother that perspective. Similarly, competitive bargainers
may treat the cooperative approach as a sign of weakness and increase
their manipulative tactics accordingly. Competitive bargainers may not
recognize that the cooperative approach has something valuable to offer
them, just as many men have failed to recognize that feminism can help
men as well as women. When faced with such competitive tactics, the
cooperative negotiator must either forsake the cooperative approach and
battle the competitive negotiator on her own field, continue the coopera-
tive approach and take the very real risk of "losing" to the competitor, or
quit. This choice is similar to the choice women face as lawyers: to live
according to the male standards for successful lawyering, and thus sacri-
fice our personal voices, or to live according to our own standards, and
thus sacrifice our professional careers. This problem is also reflected in
Jake and Amy's negotiating relationship. "If Jake chooses not to listen to
Amy, he can win .... If you have power, you can opt not to listen. And
you do so with impunity. 210 "If their negotiation doesn't work, they'll
have to then go back within the larger system - and in that case Jake's
voice will prevail."21 The cooperative approach lacks the societal power
and support that the competitive approach receives. This puts the coop-
erative approach at a serious disadvantage. The cooperative approach,
like the female voice, needs more societal support in order to transform
the negotiation process and the legal system.
B. Mediation
Mediation also offers a great deal of hope to feminists. The mediator
has the ability to promote cooperative negotiation between the disputing
210. 1984 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, supra note 134, at'62 (Carol Gilligan
speaking).
211. Id. (Carrie Menkel-Meadow speaking).
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parties. As explained above, cooperative negotiation helps make room in
the legal system for the female voice. The mediator, therefore, can en-
sure, even more than cooperative negotiation alone, that negotiation en-
courages maintaining relationships, open communication, party inclu-
sion, creative and inclusive solutions, and women's expression of women's
experience. Mediation can thus inject the female voice into the process of
negotiation.
Mediation can also potentially improve the substantive results of nego-
tiation for women. As I noted above,2 12 there has been some debate over
whether the mediator should take any responsibility for the fairness of
the negotiated result to the parties, to third parties, or to the community.
This additional responsibility would require the mediator to watch for,
and remedy, inequalities of bargaining power throughout the negotiation
process. If this function were taken seriously, it would require the media-
tor to occasionally take sides in the negotiation and to occasionally refuse
to accept a solution to which all parties agree. This added function could
thus keep social inequalities of power from adversely affecting the results
of mediation for women. 213
This additional fairness-ensuring function would give the mediator
greater power to ensure that cooperative bargaining is not overpowered
by competitive bargaining. Because vulnerability to competition is a seri-
ous impediment to the success of cooperative negotiation, this additional
function of mediation could be a major improvement. The function can
make mediation a more effective feminist tool by giving the cooperative
approach, and the female voice, the societal support it needs in order to
truly transform the process of dispute resolution. The substantive func-
tion may increase Amy's power by forcing Jake to listen to the female
voice. It may thus ensure that women have the opportunity to express
women's experience in our own terms and to have that experience and
those terms recognized. It may help competitive bargainers see that the
cooperative approach has value, and it may help more men see that the
female perspective has value. Moreover, the function may keep society
and the legal profession from forcing women to choose between voices.
Finally, by looking beyond the immediate parties, this function furthers
Amy's desire to take all interests (including Heinz's wife's interests, the
interests of society, and the interests of the future) into account.
This additional function can, however, inject increased hierarchy and
objectivity into the negotiation between the parties. The more involved
the third party mediator becomes, the more power she has, and the more
212. See supra text accompanying notes 104-07.
213. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
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objectivity and hierarchy enter the relationship between the parties. This
function does, therefore, have drawbacks. The increased participation of
the female perspective, however, seems to outweigh these possible draw-
backs. In addition, the problems of hierarchy and objectivity can be lim-
ited by mediators themselves. For example, a trained mediator may be
able to keep her mind open to women's subjective experience as well as
to male subjective experience, thereby limiting the exclusive maleness of
the objective stance. Similarly, such a mediator may be able to downplay
and limit the detrimental effects of hierarchy by encouraging the parties
to speak for themselves in a contextual discourse. At any rate, the hier-
archy and objectivity in mediation is much less than in adjudication,
simply because rigid adherence to legal rights, rules, and precedents is
largely unhelpful to the mediator.21
C. Arbitration
Because arbitration, as it is currently practiced,21 5 is merely a private
form of adjudication, it raises many of the same concerns for feminist
theory as judicial adjudication. Current arbitration involves adverseness,
objectivity, hierarchy, and abstraction much as judicial adjudication
does. It thus suppresses the female voice and conflicts with the central
principles of feminist theory by imposing male perspectives, standards,
and processes and by ignoring context and relationships. Arbitration also
limits parties' abilities to explore creative, inclusive, non-traditional solu-
tions to disputes by focusing on linear positioning and argument and on
limited, win/lose results. Finally, it encourages the participation of law-
yers and decreases the parties' ability to communicate directly and
openly with each other.2"'
Arbitration would more successfully serve feminist goals if it were
practiced under the mediatory approach.21 This approach requires the
arbitrator to act primarily as a mediator and more rarely as a judge.
Arbitration under this approach would serve many of the feminist pur-
poses that meditation serves. The mediator/arbitrator would foster com-
munication among the parties, work to maintain and strengthen the rela-
214. See Rifkin, supra note 12, at 27.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
216. The parties or their attorneys do, of course, communicate with the arbitrator. This
type of communication, however, is not what the female voice means by "communication."
The female perspective relies on direct, open discourse between the parties (Heinz and the
druggist), rather than limited, persuasive, hierarchical argument directed at some higher
bod), as its central process.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
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tionship between the Parties, encourage the expression of alternative
voices, and encourage creative, inclusive, nonbipolar solutions. The medi-
ator/arbitrator could arso take on the fairness-ensuring function that
may or may not be accepted as a mediation function.
However, the problems of objectivity and hierarchy that arise in medi-
ation are even more problematic in the context of the mediatory ap-
proach to arbitration. It is much harder to downplay the obvious hierar-
chical power of the arbitrator, because she ultimately makes the final,
official decision. It is also much harder to limit the effects of male-de-
fined objectivity in this context because the arbitrator's decision will very
likely be subject to judicial review or enforcement. This judicial supervi-
sory system is heavily indoctrined in objectivity and will likely insist that
the arbitrator take an objective stance.
Arbitration as it is currently practiced under the adjudicatory ap-
proach is, therefore, a slight improvement on judicial adjudication, if
only because it can avoid some of the male-dominated rules of court pro-
cess. Arbitration under the mediatory approach is potentially a great im-
provement over judicial adjudication, but is not as effective, from a femi-
nist standpoint, as mediation can be because of the increased effects of
objectivity and hierarchy.
VI. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A FEMINIST VOICE
SUGGESTIONS
Perfection of alternative dispute resolution must begin in the law
school classroom. First, of course, the law school curriculum must in-
clude alternative dispute resolution courses. The involvement of law
professors in studying alternative dispute resolution will help the move-
ment focus itself, examine itself, and work systematically to correct its
flaws. The involvement of law professors in teaching alternative dispute
resolution methods and theories to students will improve the practice of
alternative dispute resolution in the legal profession.
Feminist jurisprudential theory had focused on legal education as a
central tool for improving the practice of law in general. Just as feminist
jurisprudential theory should be an aspect of all legal education, feminist
jurisprudence should play an important part in the teaching of alterna-
tive dispute resolution. Because alternative dispute resolution challenges
traditional legal pedagogy, it should not be difficult to include the femi-
nist pedagogical challenge in alternative dispute resolution courses.
Several methods exist for teaching alternative dispute resolution: for
example, the traditional law school lecture/discussion approach, the sim-
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ulation approach, 218 and the process observation approach.219 It seems
the best approach involves a combination of these three methods. The
lecture/discussion format provides theoretical and basic procedural in-
sights. The simulation approach gives students the opportunity to assess
their own reactions to alternative resolution situations and gives them a
taste of legal practice. Finally, the process observation approach lets stu-
dents see alternatives in action, see the effects of alternative dispute reso-
lution methods on the parties, assess practice in the light of theory, as-
sess theory in the light of practice, and recognize their own assumptions
about legal process and alternatives.
What is important for the purposes of this Article, however, is the
necessity to integrate feminism into all aspects of the alternative dispute
resolution course. Alternative courses, like legal education, seem to focus
on abstract rules and methods and fixed-fact simulation exercises. These
elements of alternative dispute resolution courses encourage competition
because they lower the apparent stakes of alternative dispute resolution
processes; they take the parties out of their multi-faceted real lives and
simplify conflict resolution into a zero-sum game. Simulations are partic-
ularly guilty of this because it is so difficult for a professor to manage
and to grade a nonzero-sum or multi-faceted exercise. Creative processes
and results are difficult to measure on the standard grading curve.
Therefore, simulation exercises force students to wear blinders against
reality and to battle with their classmates for artificially scarce points.
The usual approach to alternative dispute resolution teaching encour-
ages, even demands, the male perspective. Context, a central element of
the female perspective, is limited in order to facilitate grading. Points
must be made artificially scarce in order to fit grades onto the proper
curve. Evaluation must be objective in order to preveqt bias. The combi-
nation of abstraction, scarcity of resources, and objectivity is deadly to
the female voice. The effects of this combination on stidents ensures that
the female voice will remain silent even after the class ends. By encour-
aging competition and discouraging creativity, this combination rein-
forces the male perspective students learn in their traditional courses and
makes alternative dispute resolution less meaningful as an alternative to
adjudication.2 '
218. See, e.g., Green, A Comprehensive Approach to the Theory and Practice of Dis-
pute Resolution, 34 J. LEGAL EDuc. 249 (1984).
219. See Bush, Us;ng Process Observation to Teach Alternative Dispute Resolution: Al-
ternatives to Simulation, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 46 (1987). This approach requires students to
observe several actual alternative dispute resolution sessions and then discuss their observa-
tions in class.
220. See Hegland, Moral Dilemmas in Teaching Trial Advocacy, 32 J.LEGAL EDUC. 69
(1982) (discussing the effects of such simulations in trial advocacy courses).
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How, then, can alternative courses make alternative dispute resolution
a more meaningful alternative? By changing the game. The lecture/dis-
cussion aspect of an alternative dispute resolution course should empha-
size the practical and theoretical benefits (both under traditional argu-
ments and under feminist theory) of the more productive (socially and
economically) alternative dispute resolution methods: cooperative negoti-
ation, mediation with a substantive fairness element, and the mediatory
approach to arbitration. Further, the lecture/discussion part of the
course should expressly deal with Jake and Amy's story, should en-
courage both voices to participate in discussion, and should encourage
students to try using both voices. This discussion will legitimate both
voices. This will also allow exploration of how Amy's voice and Jake's
voice interact.22 1 The lecture should also focus explicitly on the failures
of the adjudicatory system, and particularly on the limits of our assump-
tions about scarcity of resources and the necessity of adversarial
behavior.
The simulations in an alternative dispute resolution course should be
fewer in number and greater in complexity. Professors should go out on a
limb: encourage creativity, cooperation, complexity, context, inclusion,
and expression in simulation exercises. 222 Students have already learned
adverseness. They need practice in reality. Further, professors should
have students explain the benefits of their chosen processes and results.
This allows students to integrate theory and practice. This may make
grading, not only more challenging, but also more interesting.
The process observation approach 223 should be part of alternative dis-
ppte resolution courses. This approach allows students to see the pos-
sibilities and the realities of alternative dispute resolution. It exposes stu-
dents' assumptions about dispute resolution processes and subjects them
to critical analysis. It encourages students to examine the many interests
at stake and the many possible solutions. The process observation ap-
proach also exposes students to the variety of dispute resolution methods
in action and allows concrete examination and comparison.
224
The broad process observation approach has several benefits. It makes
room in the law school curriculum, and in alternative dispute resolution
processes, for the female voice. It helps create lawyers who can look be-
221. See Spiegelman, Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice in the Law School
Curriculum: The Logic of Jake's Ladder in the Context of Amy's Web, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC.
243, 252-55 (1988).
222. Id. at 250-52 (explaining how these attributes are useful in legal education gener-
ally). See also id. at 257-60 (discussing the value of experiential learning to legal
education).
223. See Bush, supra note 219.
224. Id.
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yond narrow objectivity and abstraction in their search for fuller versions
of truth and justice. Furthermore, it helps make alternative dispute reso-
lution a real and useful alternative to judicial adjudication.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the theory, goals, and methods of the alter-
native dispute resolution processes of negotiation, mediation, and arbitra-
tion. It has shown how these alternative dispute resolution processes in
practice fail to live up to their own goals. Further, it has explored the
theory and goals of feminist jurisprudence. The Article explored how al-
ternative dispute resolution has failed to achieve its potential in feminist
terms. Finally, it has explored how these failures can be corrected in
legal education.
I believe that alternative dispute resolution has tremendous potential
as a means for improving dispute resolution and as a means for giving
women, as disputants and as lawyers, the freedom necessary to explore
our own voices, however we may speak. Alternative dispute resolution
has the potential to help make room in the world for women's experi-
ence, and thus to help transform both the world and women's experience.
It will, however, take concerted effort on the parts of legal scholars,
professors, students, and practitioners to make alternative dispute resolu-
tion achieve its potential.

